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Abstract. The so-called theory of karma is one of the distinguishing
aspects of Hinduism and other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. At the
same time that the theory can be seen as closely connected with the free-
dom of will and action that we humans supposedly have, it has many
times been said to be determinist and fatalist. The purpose of this paper
is to analyze in some deepness the relations that are between the the-
ory of karma on one side and determinism, fatalism and free-will on the
other side. In order to do that, I shall use what has been described as the
best formal approach we have to indeterminism: branching time theory.
More speciﬁcally, I shall introduce a branching time semantic framework
in which, among other things, statements such as “state of aﬀairs e is
a karmic eﬀect of agent a”, “a wills it to be the case that e” and “e is
inevitable” could be properly represented.
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1. Introduction
The so-called theory of karma, or law of karma, is one of the distinguish-
ing aspects of Hinduism and other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. There
have been many descriptions of the theory of karma, from the usually obscure
passages of the Upanishads and accounts made by several ﬁgures of Mahab-
harata and puranas, to the sometimes overconﬁdent descriptions of modern
Indian gurus. From the western scholar point of view, we have witnessed an
increase in interest in the theory of karma during the last decades (see, e.g.,
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[8,10,17,25,26,28] and [30]); the recent debate on the theory of karma as a
solution to the problem of evil (see [7,19,20] and [34]) is a good instance of
this. However, and despite of this, there is an important issue which remains
understudied: the connection between the theory of karma on one side and
determinism, fatalism and free-will on the other side.
The theory of karma1 has many times been said to be determinist and
fatalist: “if we are justiﬁed in our acceptance of the causal dogma [of the theory
of karma], there does not seem to be any legitimate way to avoid fatalism. If
the present is determined by the past so as to admit of an accurate prediction
of the past [. . . ], how can we avoid the conclusion that the future is similarly
determined by the past and the present?” ([35], p. 82). In fact, according to
the theory of karma, our present actions somehow determine our future states
of being, including our disposition to act and desire in speciﬁc ways. So, if
the theory of karma is true, it seems we are faced with something very close
to determinism and fatalism (at least in a localized way) as well as with an
absence of free-will.
On the other hand, there is a sense in which the law of karma is closely
connected with the freedom of will and action that we humans supposedly have.
Radhakrishnan, for example, says as follows: “Man is not a mere product of
nature. He is mightier than his karma. [. . . ] The law of karma, which rules
the lower nature of man, has nothing to do with the spiritual in him [. . . ]
The essence of spirit is freedom. By its exercise man can check and control
his natural impulses.” ([29], p. 246). In fact, the whole purpose of the theory
of karma is to function as a moral retributive law regarding the actions we
humans do. But if there is no freedom of will, and the future, including our
future actions, is completely determined by our past actions, in which sense
can these actions be said to be ours?
My purpose in this paper is to analyze in some deepness the relations
that are between the theory of karma on one hand and determinism, fatalism
and free-will on the other hand. In order to do that, I shall use what has been
described as the best formal approach we have to indeterminism: branching
time theory ([1,3–6]). Besides being an interesting framework for saying what
determinism, indeterminism and fatalism are, branching time theory has been
quite successfully used to formalize several kinds of agentive sentences, notably
sentences describing action-like events (see, e.g., [2,9,16,33] and [36]). This is
important because a minimally detailed description of the theory of karma
should take into account the actions agents do and the karmic eﬀects coming
from them. Therefore, one of my primary tasks will be to develop a semantic
framework in which statements such as “state of aﬀairs e is a karmic eﬀect of
agent a”, as well as “a wills it to be the case that e” and “e is inevitable”, might
be represented; following the standard in philosophical logic, this will be done
1 As it shall be elaborated in the next Section, the theory of karma can be described as
follows: besides its purely physical eﬀects, our actions have also moral and psychological
eﬀects, which might occur either in this life or in future ones, and which aﬀect our environ-
ment, genetic make-up, physical characteristics, social status at birth, length of life, etc., as
well as our psychological dispositions and tendencies to act, desire, etc.
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with the help of modal operators deﬁned inside this semantic framework. With
the operators and semantics at hand I will be able to deﬁne in a minimally
precise way the notions of determinism, fatalism and (lack of) free-will so that
their relations with the theory of karma might become clearer.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next Section I lay down
the basic principles of karma theory, which together form the subject matter of
my analysis. In Sect. 3 I informally introduce the modal operators I shall use
in the rest of the paper and present a preliminary but important analysis of
some of those principles. In Sects. 4 and 5 I introduce the semantic framework
which will be used in the next Section to conclude the analysis I have started
in Sect. 3. Finally in Sect. 7 I lay down some concluding remarks.
2. General Principles of the Theory of Karma
Before starting my analysis, it is useful to make a couple of considerations
about the theory or law of karma. First of all, there is a problem, someone
might claim, with the use of the words “theory” and “law” here: it is not
clear at all in which sense the theory of karma is a theory or law. Although
no defendable synonymous for these words appear in the Sanskrit texts which
inspired the doctrine, these terms have become standard among modern Indian
and western writers. A more cautious and realistic position would be to take
these words in a broader sense, meaning the same as “doctrine”, “concept”,
“idea”, etc. It is cautious because in this way we do not have to explain the
relation of the doctrine with modern and contemporary uses of the words
“theory” and “law”; it is realistic because it takes into account the variety
of diﬀerent understandings that exist about the theory of karma in Indian
tradition. This takes us to the next consideration.
From a strict point of view, we cannot talk about the theory of karma.
Indian philosophical and religious tradition has produced many diﬀerent views
of what the doctrine is. This point can be illustrated in several ways. Rocher,
for instance, has found ﬁve systems of karma and rebirth in one single chapter
of one Indian scripture: the twelfth book of the Manusmrti [32]. Aspects such
as the possibility of karma transfer, divine intervention in the karmic process,
nulliﬁcation of karma, the way karma is fructiﬁed, the role of samskaras in the
karmic process, just to mention the most prominent ones, are interpreted quite
diﬀerently in diﬀerent traditions. We have Buddhist views on karma, which are
considerably diﬀerent from Jain ones, which diﬀer from Advaita Vedanta ones,
which are diﬀerent from the view of theist versions of Vedanta, and so on and
so forth (see [10,25,26] and [30]).
This might lead one to argue that it is simply misleading to speak of
something like the theory of karma. One cannot speak of the theory of karma
outside a speciﬁc Indian religious tradition. You have to pick up one tradition
or a speciﬁc set of texts and see what it says about the doctrine; this will
give you the only thing you can have: a theory of karma. This is one of the
criticisms Chadha and Trakakis [7] make about Kaufman’s analysis [19] of the
role of the theory of karma in the problem of evil. And it is a quite reasonable
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criticism. However, that one cannot speak about the theory of karma does not
imply that there are not principles and presuppositions common to all diﬀerent
theories of karma. The doctrine of rebirth is surely part of most, if not all, post-
Vedic theories of karma; the same can be said about the causal aspect of the
law of karma (see, e.g., [11,18,21,23] and [27]). That these principles do not
form a theory of karma does not mean that their study cannot shed light on
the existing versions of the theory of karma. On the contrary: by being, we
suppose, the common core of all theories of karma, their analysis might tell a
lot about these theories. That is the purpose of the rest of this section: to try
to disclose some key presuppositions or principles common to all theories of
karma.2
To start with, I will say that the basic idea of the theory of karma is
this: besides its purely physical eﬀects, our actions have also moral and psy-
chological eﬀects, which might occur either in this life or in future ones, and
which aﬀect our environment, genetic make-up, physical characteristics, social
status at birth, length of life, etc., as well as our psychological dispositions and
tendencies to act, desire, etc.
Here we have the popular idea related to karma theory that while morally
good actions cause proportionally good states of aﬀairs, morally bad actions
cause proportionally bad states of aﬀairs ([26], p. xi). These eﬀects or conse-
quences are also connected with the agent’s physique: in order for an action
to be classiﬁed as good or bad, for instance, the agent’s intentions have to
be taken into account.3 This connection however is two-sided. Besides includ-
ing our environment, genetic make-up, physical characteristics, social status
at birth, length of life, etc. (that is, virtually everything that matters in one’s
life), the eﬀects of one’s actions also include one’s psychological dispositions
and tendencies to act, desire, etc., corresponding to the famous notion of sam-
skara (see [30], pp. 19–21).
From this brief description it is also clear that the theory of karma is a
causal theory (see [30], pp. 24–43); after all, it prescribes, even if in a vague and
general way, how certain eﬀects follow from certain agentive causes. Adopting
the view that if a full description of a causal relation is possible at all it should
be done in terms of sets of suﬃcient conditions (see [22]; Mill [24] seems to
also endorse this view), I can state as follows: If, according to the theory
of karma, (1) if such and such (kind of) action c is performed and certain
antecedent conditions are met, then such and such (kind of) eﬀect e follows
and (2) action c (or an instance of the action-kind c) is performed and the
2 I shall from now on use the expressions “theory of karma” and “law of karma” to refer
either to this set of basic presuppositions or to some idealistic or popular view of the doctrine
which might help us in the task of ﬁnding out about these basic principles.
3 Some traditions go as far as saying that the condition of one’s next life is fully determined
by his or her psychological condition at the moment of death. E.g., verse 6 of chapter 8 of
the Bhagavad-gita: “Moreover, whatever state of being he remembers when he gives up the
body at the end, he goes respectively to that state of being, Arjuna, transformed into that
state of being.”
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corresponding conditions are met, then (3) e (or an instance of the eﬀect-kind
e) occurs.
Based on this, I deﬁne the notion of karmic eﬀect as follows: a karmic
eﬀect of an agent a is an eﬀect of one or more actions already performed by a
whose antecedent conditions were met. With this notion at hand, I lay down
what I see as the ﬁrst basic principle of karma theory. Let s be a state of aﬀairs
and a an agent.
Cause–Eﬀect Principle If s is a karmic eﬀect of a, then s is (or will be) the
case.
This principle guarantees that the theory of karma really works, that is
to say, that a karmic eﬀect of an agent indeed occurs (or will occur).
Besides this causal side, the theory of karma has also, as we know, a
moral side: a karmic eﬀect s of an agent a should be morally proportional to
the actions a did which caused s. This is the idea behind the popular saying
that one reaps what one sows and it is why the law of karma is many times
saw as a retributive law, or still, as the implementation of some principle of
cosmic justice ([11], p. 2). As such, it seems obvious that a’s karmic eﬀects
must somehow aﬀect a: after all, they have to do with a’s environment, a’s
genetic make-up, a’s physical characteristics, a’s social status at birth, a’s
length of life, as well as with a’s psychological dispositions and tendencies to
act. Therefore the following principle:
Person-Aﬀecting Principle If s is a karmic eﬀect of a, then s aﬀects a.
Along with the Cause–Eﬀect Principle, which is a predictive principle,
the Person-Aﬀecting Principle allows one to speak about the way future will
be with respect to an agent. The most appealing side of the theory of karma,
however, has been its supposedly explanatory power ([26], p. xi). Defenders
of the theory have promoted it by saying that only by making reference to
theory of karma can we explain otherwise unexplainable events regarding one’s
condition of life.4 From a general viewpoint, the idea is that all that matters in
one’s life must be explained as the karmic result of his or her previous actions.
We thus have the following principle:
Explanation Principle If an actual state of aﬀairs s aﬀects a, then s is a karmic
eﬀect of a.
Here is another principle:
Change Principle The pool of karmic eﬀects of an agent can change.
This principle is a very important tenet of karma theory. Since the actu-
alization of a karmic eﬀect might be temporally very distant from the actions
4 Why, for instance, one child is born in a very comfortable situation, in a wealthy family,
good looking, healthy, etc., and other is born in a very diﬀerent environment: unhealthy and
in a poor and problematic family? The answer is that while the ﬁrst one had a virtuous
previous life, the second one must have had a sinful previous life, or at least committed a
couple of immoral acts; they are just reaping what they sowed. From a theist perspective,
this would free God from the threat of being unjust.
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which caused it (in fact, they might take place in an agent’s future life), some
traditions have come up with the notion of a karmic pool, a pool of created
but not ‘enjoyed’ karmic eﬀects ([30], pp. 19–22). The idea of this principle is
that this pool of karmic eﬀects can (and usually do) change. This has to do
with the obvious fact that since a is performing new actions at every moment,
he or she is creating new karmic eﬀects, which will be added to the old ones.
Second, when a karmic eﬀect becomes the case, it is not part any more of the
karmic pool of the agent. Finally, some versions of karma theory admit the
possibility of a’s nullifying or transferring a karmic eﬀect which has already
been created but has not yet become the case ([27], pp. 10–13).
But for this principle to work, it is necessary that there might be possible
ways the world could be which are incompatible with a’s karmic pool at a
given moment of time. Let t be a speciﬁc moment of time. If all ontological
possibilities the world could be are compatible with a’s karmic pool at t, then
there would be no room for a’s karmic pool to change at a moment posterior
to t. By a’s karmic pool at t being incompatible with a way the world could be
I simply mean that at least one of the karmic eﬀects of a’s karmic pool at t is
not the case in this way things could be. Therefore we have a further principle:
Incompatibility Principle There are ways the world could be which are incom-
patible with the karmic eﬀects of a at t.
3. Freedom of Will, Determinism and Fatalism: A Preliminary
Approach
Now, how do these principles work together? How are they related to the issues
of free-will and determinism? And how might they be represented inside a for-
mal framework? I will in this section make some preliminary but important
steps towards answering these questions. I will work on a very elementary log-
ical level, leaving the full formal work to the next sections. I will also postpone
the analysis of the two last conditions; as it shall be clear in the course of the
text, the analysis of the Change Principle and the Incompatibility Principle
will have to wait until Sect. 6.
Let us consider the Cause–Eﬀect Principle ﬁrst: If s is a karmic eﬀect of
a, then s is (or will be) the case. First of all, we need a way to represent that
s is a karmic eﬀect of a. I shall do that with the help of a modal operator, KE.
Let a be an agent and α a sentence, formula or proposition.5 Formula [a]KE:α
means that the state of aﬀairs represented by α is a karmic eﬀect of a.6 In this
way, the Cause–Eﬀect Principle would be represented as follows:
5 I shall here overlook the technical diﬀerences that are between the terms “sentence”,
“proposition” and “formula”.
6 Most of the time I shall drop reference to the fact that what is a karmic eﬀect of a is not
α itself, but the state of aﬀairs represented by α, and simply speak of α’s being the karmic
eﬀect of a. A similar movement will be done with the other formal sentences to be introduced
later.
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(1) [a]KE:α → α7
The situation where α is the case in a future moment could be represented
with the help of the tense operator F: if α is a formula, Fα means that α will
be the case. Thus:
(2) [a]KE:Fα → F α
But there is a problem here. Due to the questions I am addressing, there
should be room in this simple language for an indeterminist view of the future.
According to such a view, writing Fα does not mean that α will be deﬁnitively
true, but simply that in one way the world could be in the future, α is true.
See however that this understanding of Fα conﬂicts with what we want (2)
really to say. The idea of this tense version of the Cause–Eﬀect Principle is
not that if Fα is a karmic eﬀect of a then α is true in a possible way the future
could be: we want Fα to be true independently of which of the possible future
courses of the history becomes the case. In other words, we want the truth of
Fα to be inevitable. Letting I be a modal operator such that I:α means that α
is inevitable, (2) should be rewritten then as follows:
(3) [a]KE:Fα → I:(F α)
A similar reasoning can be made to generalize this idea and show that
the correct way to represent the Cause–Eﬀect Principle is as follows:
(CEP) [a]KE:α → I: α
As far as the Person-Aﬀecting Principle—if s is a karmic eﬀect of a, then
s aﬀects a—is concerned, I will use a very simple approach to represent the
notion of aﬀectability: a state of aﬀairs e aﬀects agent a if and only if a wills it
to be the case that e or a wills it to be the case that non-e. This is of course a
psychological approach: insofar as a has some attachment or aversion towards
e, e has some impact on a’s mental states and attitudes; therefore e aﬀects a.
But if I am to represent the notion of aﬀectability in terms of a’s will, I
need a way to represent a’s willing a certain state of aﬀairs to be the case. Let
a be an agent and α a formula. [a]Will:α means that a wills it to be the case
that α. The notion of aﬀectability will then be introduced as follows:
(DEFw) [a]Aﬀect:α =def ([a]Will:α)∨([a]Will:¬ α)
[a]Aﬀect:α means that a is aﬀected by the state of aﬀairs represented by α.
Having said this, here is the Person-Aﬀecting Principle:
(PAP) [a]KE:α →[a]Aﬀect:α
The representation of the Explanation Principle is straightforward:
(EP) α∧[a]Aﬀect:α →[a]KE:α
Addressing now the second question I have posed in the beginning of this
section, the threat to free-will generally associated with the theory of karma
might be represented as follows:
7 The symbols →, ¬, ∧ and ∨ are been used here with their usual meaning.
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(FW) [a]Will:α →I:([a]Will:α)
That is to say, if the fact that a wills it to be the case that α implies that
this willing is inevitable, that is to say, that it had to happen, then there is
no freedom of will. I am assuming here an incompatibilist view of free-will:
for an agent a to freely will it to be the case that α requires that there were
a plurality of futures open to a so that he or she could have willed otherwise
(see [14]).
From (EP) and (CEP), through the transitivity of material implication,
we obtain what I name the Karmic Inevitability Principle:
(KIP) α∧[a]Aﬀect:α →I:α,
of which the following formula is a trivial instance:
(4) [a]Will:α∧[a]Aﬀect:([a]Will:α) →I:([a]Will:α).
(4) basically says that if a wills it to be the case that α and is aﬀected by his
or her willing, then his or her willing is inevitable. Or, in a non-abbreviated
form:
(4′) [a]Will:α∧([a]Will:([a]Will:α)∨[a]Will:¬([a]Will:α)) →I:([a]Will:α)
We could easily get (FW) from (4) if the following principle were true:
(5) [a]Will:α →[a]Will:([a]Will:α)∨[a]Will:¬([a]Will:α)
But clearly it is not. There are many instances of willing in which I will that
α but neither will that I will that α nor will that I do not will that α: I might
will this paper to be ﬁnished soon without willing that I will this paper to be
ﬁnished soon, nor willing that I do not will this paper to be ﬁnished soon.
However, there are many cases of willing in which either [a]Will:([a]Will:α)
or [a]Will:¬([a]Will:α) is true. For instance, I might be addicted to alcohol and
will to drink as much as possible. However, being aware of this addiction and
willing to stop it, both propositions might quite reasonably be true:
(6) [I]Will:(I drink as much as possibe)
(7) [I]Will:¬([I]Will:(I drink as much as possibe))
The same can be said about my willing to help others. I know that it is a good
thing and I want to keep doing it. Therefore, the two propositions below might
be true as well:
(8) [I]Will:(I help other people)
(9) [I]Will:([I]Will:(I help other people))
These examples seem to be a sort of second-order willing where besides
willing α the agent also wills to will that α or wills not to will that α. I could
perhaps say that conscious moral willing have this feature: if I am aware of
the moral aspect of my willing, I shall have one of those two attitudes towards
it, depending on whether I see its content as good or bad. And assuming that
a moral agent must be aware of the moral quality of his acts and wills, that
is to say, that moral willing is always conscious moral willing, I could further
say that if α has a moral content and a is moral agent, then (5) is true. As a
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consequence of that, (FW) would also be true; in other words, for this kind of
second order willing in general and moral willing in particular there would be
no freedom of will.
This is certainly odd, for while there is no threat to freedom of ﬁrst-order
will, second-order will would be inevitable. Perhaps we could try to make sense
of this through the notion of samskara. Usually, samskaras are understood as
tendencies or dispositions to act, think, desire, etc. caused by our previous
actions ([30], pp. 19–21). The performance of good and bad deeds produce a
tendency to act and will accordingly. If it is correct that moral willing is con-
scious moral willing, that is, that (5) is true in the case α has a moral content
and a is moral agent, then the fact that (FW) is also true for α and a can be
seen as a representation of the impact of karma upon the will of moral agents.
Unfortunately this attempt to soft down the problem does not work.
Suppose that α means “this paper is ﬁnished soon” and a means myself. As
I have stated above, it is true that [a]Will:α but false that [a]Will:([a]Will:
α)∨[a]Will:¬([a]Will:α). However, suppose that at a posterior moment of time I
get so stressed with my working that I will that I had not the desire to ﬁnish the
paper soon. Therefore, [a]Will:¬([a]Will:α) is now true, as it is the antecedent
of (4). As such, the consequent, I:([a]Will:α), is also true. So, although earlier
my willing this paper to be ﬁnished soon was free, my mere willing not to will
it transformed it into an inevitable event.
About the charge that the theory of karma leads to determinism and
fatalism, I am interested here in what is called causal determinism (see [12] and
[15]). Among the several kinds of causal determinism found in the philosophical
literature, we can distinguish between what might be called global determinism
and local determinism:
Global Determinism The world is determinist (or is governed by determinism)
if and only if, given a speciﬁed way things are at a moment of time t, the way
things go in moments posterior to t is ﬁxed.
Local Determinism A state of aﬀairs e happening at moment of time t is
determinist if and only if e’s being the case was ﬁxed by the way things were
at a moment anterior to t.
Given the conceptual tools we have so far, the formula bellow is the closest we
can get to these two deﬁnitions of determinism:
(Det) α →P(I:Fα)
where P is the past tense modal operator: if α is a formula, Pα means that α
was the case. (Det) says that if α is the case, then that α will be the case was
inevitable.
By saying that (Det) is the closest we can get to these deﬁnitions of
determinism I mean two things. First, that (1) if state of aﬀairs e is determinist
and α is its representation in our language, then (Det) is true and that (2) if
the world is determinist, then (Det) is true for every proposition α. Second,
although the other way round is clearly not true, that is to say, (Det) might
be true with no causal determinism, from the point of view of the formal
representational machinery we have so far, it is the farthest we can get. In
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the next section, when I introduce the full formal apparatus of branching time
theory, I will be able to give a much more reﬁned account of determinism.
From now on, I shall take (Det) as implying both sorts of determinism.
As far as fatalism is concerned, it has been understood in at least two
diﬀerent ways: as an attitude of resignation in the face of some future events
which are thought to be inevitable, or as the view that whatever will happen
in the future is inevitable or unavoidable, in the strict sense of the words (not
avoidable or evitable, by no human means at least) [31]. I am concerned with
this second sense of fatalism. There are alike at least two sorts of fatalism in
this sense:
Global Fatalism A fatalist view is one that claims that whatever will happen
in the future is inevitable.
Local Fatalism A fatalist view of future event e claims that e is inevitable.
Both views can be represented as follows:
(Fat) Fα →I:Fα
Now, (KIP) says that if α is true and agent a is aﬀected by α, then α is
inevitable. It is quite reasonable to suppose that most propositions will aﬀect
some agent. It is hard to do any sort of quantiﬁcation here, but calling these
propositions agent-aﬀecting propositions (α is an agent-aﬀecting proposition if
and only if [a]Aﬀect:α is true for some agent a), we have that the following is
true:
(10) α →I:α, where α is an agent-aﬀecting proposition
If α is inevitable, it is reasonable to suppose that in the past the proposi-
tion that α will be true was also inevitable; in other words, I:α seems to imply
P(I:Fα). Therefore, from (10) we get
(Detaa) α →P(I:Fα), where α is an agent-aﬀecting proposition
Also from (10), through a very simple substitution, we get
(Fataa) Fα →I:Fα, where Fα is an agent-aﬀecting proposition
(KIP) therefore implies qualiﬁed versions of both local determinism and local
fatalism, as well as of (FW)—(4) is basically an agent-aﬀecting proposition
version of (FW).
Two points have to be made before I end this section. First, the con-
clusions I got about free-will, determinism and fatalism were possible due to
(KIP). In its turn, (KIP) was obtained through (EP), (CEP) and the transi-
tivity of material implication. Therefore, at least inside this simple represen-
tational framework, the connection between the theory of karma on one side
and free-will, determinism and fatalism on the other rest on these two prin-
ciples: (EP) and (CEP); rejecting either one or the other would dissolve the
connection. Otherwise said, if a karma theorist does not want to commit him-
self or herself to qualiﬁed, but quite strong versions of a determinist, fatalist
and free-will-less view of the world, he or she will have to reject either (EP)
or (CEP).
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Second, there is another way we can see the conjunction of (EP) and
(CEP) as problematic. A quite reasonable principle of our inevitability oper-
ator is this:
(Inev) I:α → α
From it along with (CEP) we get [a]KE:α → α. Along with (PAP) we get
[a]KE:α → α∧[a]Aﬀect:α. But this, along with (EP) allows us to obtain
(11) α∧[a]Aﬀect:α ↔[a]KE:α,
that is to say, that α’s being a karmic eﬀect of a is equivalent to the α’s being
true and aﬀecting a. This is problematic because it completely empties the
concept of karmic eﬀect, which now can be deﬁned in terms of the concepts of
truth and aﬀectability.
4. Branching Time Theory
The purpose of the last section was to show how some relevant consequences
can be drawn from a simple representation of the principles and concepts
involved in our discussion. It also had the purpose of providing a motivation
for a deeper investigation of the theme, preferentially inside a formal framework
in which the meanings of the elements of the language, in special the modal
operators, are satisfactorily deﬁned. This is what I shall be doing from now
on.
To start with, here is the formal deﬁnition of the language (I shall limit
myself to the propositional case):
Definition 4.1. Let A be a countable set of names of agents and P a countable
set of propositional symbols. The language of karma (in symbols: LK) is deﬁned
as follows:
(i) If α ∈P, then α ∈ LK;
(ii) If α, β ∈ LK, then ¬ α,α∧ β,α∨ β,α → β ∈ LK;
(iii) If α ∈ LK, then Pα,Fα ∈ LK;
(iv) If α ∈ LK, then HI:α,LI:α,GI:α,KI:α ∈ LK;
(v) If α ∈ LK and a ∈ A, then [a]KE:α,[a]Will:α ∈ LK;
As we saw, the modal operator Aﬀect is deﬁned in terms of Will, ∨
and ¬:
(DEFw) [a]Aﬀect:α =def ([a]Will:α)∨([a]Will:¬ α)
The only items in this deﬁnition I have not explained yet are the ones
contained in (iv). They are inevitability operators: HI, LI, GI and KI stand,
respectively, for historical inevitability, local inevitability, global inevitability
and karmic inevitability. HI:α means that α is historically inevitable, LI:α that
α is locally inevitable, GI:α that α is globally inevitable and KI:α that α is
karmically inevitable. They are meant to replace the inevitability operator I;
why this is required will be clear after I lay down the semantic components
needed to evaluate these operators.
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Definition 4.2. A model M is a sextuple < T,≺,V,G, || ||,W,K > where
(i) T is a non-empty set of moments of time;
(ii) ≺ is a non-reﬂexive, transitive and asymmetric relation between
moments of time such that, for any t1,t2,t3 ∈ T, if t3 is such that t1 ≺ t3
and t2 ≺ t3, then either t1 = t2 or t1 ≺ t2 or t2 ≺ t1 (no backward ram-
iﬁcation condition) and for any t1, t2 ∈ T, there is t3 ∈ T such that
t3 ≺ t1 and t3 ≺ t2 (historical connection condition);
A moment of time is a spatially complete and instantaneous event or,
if you wish, an instantaneous world-slice. It is a nonrelativistic idea, but one
which helps us to settle our intuitions about time and causation ([1], p. 370). ≺
is a causal temporal ordering relation between moments of time. If t1, t2 ∈ T
are such that t1 ≺ t2, then we say that t2 is posterior to t1 (or that t1 is
anterior to t2) as well as that t2 is partially, at least, caused by t1. ≺ sets our
view of time as branching instead of linear: there might be t1, t2 ∈ T such that
neither t1 ≺ t2 nor t2 ≺ t1. However, as non-connected as they might be, there
is always a moment t3 ∈ T anterior to t1 and t2 (that is: t3 ≺ t1and t3 ≺ t2)
which ‘links’ them to the same ‘tree’; this is what the historical connection
condition says. We say in this case that t1 and t2 are incompatible future
possibilities of t3. But there cannot be a moment t4 anterior to t1(t4 ≺ t1)
and diﬀerent from t3 such that neither t3 ≺ t4 nor t4 ≺ t3. In other words,
while the future is branching, the past is linear; this is what the no backward
ramiﬁcation condition says. Finally, the condition of asymmetry indicates that
moments of time are non-repeatable events.
From these two ﬁrst components of our model a couple of important
concepts can be deﬁned:
Definition 4.3. A history is a maximal chain deﬁned on < T,≺>. We call H
the set of all histories.
Definition 4.4. Let h,h′∈ H and t ∈ T. h and h′ share the same past at t (in
symbols: h ∼=t h′) iﬀ, for all t′≺t, t′∈h and t′∈h′.
Definition 4.5. Let h,h′∈H. h and h′ split at t (in symbols: h ←→t h′) iﬀ h ∼=t
h′ and there is one and only one t′∈h such that t≺t′ and h ∼=t′ h′.
Definition 4.6. The set of alternatives T is a partition of T such that t,t′∈ T
belong to the same partition (which might be referred to either as Tt or Tt′)
iﬀ, for all h,h′∈ H, h ∼=t h′ sss h ∼=t′ h′.
Definition 4.7. Let t,t′∈ T and h,h′∈ Tt be such that t ∈ h but t/∈h′. t′ is the
splitting moment of Tt (in symbols: t′←→Tt) iﬀ h ←→t′ h′.
Definition 4.8. The set of instants I is a partition of T such that t,t′∈ T belong
to the same partition (which might be referred either as It or It′) iﬀ Tt = Tt′
or t′′ and t′′′ belong to the same instant (It′′ = It′′′), where t′′ is the splitting
moment of Tt and t′′′ is the splitting moment of Tt′ .
Our concept of history corresponds to the intuitive notion of his-
tory, except that the intuitive notion encompasses only the past, whereas
Vol. 11 (2017) Karma Theory, Determinism, Fatalism 47
ours encompasses the future as well. In the ﬁgure below, while moments
t11, t21, t31, t41 and t51 belong to history h1, moments t11, t21, t31, t42 and t54
belong to history h2.
t51
t41
t31
t21
t11
t42
t54
h1 h2
t52 t53 t57 t58 t59
t43 t44
Ƭ1 Ƭ2
Ƭ3 Ƭ4
I1
I2
t55
Despite being diﬀerent, h1 and h2 share the same past at t41 as well as at
t42, t31, t21 and t11. That is because they split at t31. t41 and t42 belong to the
same alternative T3 (which can also be referred to as Tt41 or Tt42); t43 and t44
belong to alternative T4; t51, t52 and t53 belong to T1; and t57, t58 and t59 belong
to T2. Finally, while t51, t52, t53, t54, t57, t58, t59 and the other unmentioned
moments of the same level belong to instant I1 (which might also be referred
to as It51 , It52 , It53 and so on), t41, t42, t43 and t44 belong to instant I2.
Definition 4.2 (continuation). A model M is a sextuple < T,≺,V,G,|| ||,W,K >
where
(iii) V: PxT → {true, false} is a function which, given a moment of time,
maps propositional symbols to truth-values;
V is the truth function which evaluates the truth value of atomic formulas for
each one of the moments of T.
Even though I have not ﬁnished introducing the elements of the model,
it might be useful to stop for a while and comment on the way tense and
inevitable formulas are evaluated. In order to do that, I will have to start
deﬁning the evaluation relation ||−. In the logic of branching time, the evalua-
tion relation ||− (which, given a model M, says whether a formula α is true at
M) has as parameter, besides a moment of time, also a history ([36], p. 323).
This is because of the ambiguity concerning future tense formulas. Intuitively,
F α is true at moment t if and only if α is true at a moment posterior to t. But
if we say that Fα is true, say, at t31,do we mean by this that for each history h
passing through t31 α is true at some moment t′ posterior to t31 such that t ∈
h? Or is it just for at least one history passing through t31? Or, still, is it for a
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speciﬁc history h passing through t31 so that besides a moment of time t the
evaluation of formulas has also a history h as parameter? Usually branching
time theorists pick the third option. M ||−t,h α then means that formula α is
true or satisﬁed in model M, moment of time t and history h; naturally, t and
h are such that t ∈ h.
Definition 4.9. Let M =< T,≺,V,G,|| ||,K,W > be a model, t ∈ T a moment
of time, h ∈ H a history such that t ∈ h, α ∈ LK a formula and p ∈ P a
propositional symbol.
(i) M ||−t,h p iﬀ V(p,t) = true;
(ii) M ||−t,h ¬ α iﬀ M /||−t,h α8;
(iii) M ||−t,h α∧ β iﬀ M ||−t,h α and M ||−t,h β;
(iv) M ||−t,h α∨ β iﬀ M ||−t,h α or M ||−t,h β;
(v) M ||−t,h α → β iﬀ M /||−t,h α or M ||−t,h β;
(vi) M ||−t,h Fα iﬀ, for some t′∈h such that t≺t′, M ||−t′,h α;
(vii) M ||−t,h Pα iﬀ, for some t′≺t, M ||−t′,h α;
(viii) M ||−t,h HI:α iﬀ, for all h′∈H such that t∈ h′, M ||−t,h′ α;
(ix) M ||−t,h LI:α iﬀ for all t′∈ Tt and all h′∈H such that t′ ∈h′, M ||−t′,h′ α;
(x) M ||−t,h GI:α iﬀ for all t′∈It and all h′∈H such that t′∈h′, M ||−t′,h′ α;
As it can be seen, the semantic deﬁnition of logical connectives and propo-
sitional symbols follow the standard in modal logic. The same holds for tense
operators. As far as the inevitability operators are concerned, HI, LI and GI
form a gradation in our view of inevitability: (1) GI:α entails LI:α and (2)
LI:α entails HI:α; also (3) LI:α entails P(HI:Fα). In order to illustrate the use
of these operators, suppose a model M such that V(p, t51) = V(p, t52) =
V(p, t53) = V(p, t41) = V(p, t42) = V(p, t43) = V(p, t44) = V(p, t55) =
true and V(p, t54) = false, where p is a propositional symbol of M. In this
way, we have that M ||−t41,h1 HI:Fp, M ||−t51,h1 LI:p and M ||−t41,h1 GI:p; but
since V(p, t54) = false, M /||−t54,h1 LI:p and M /||−t51,h1 GI:p. The deﬁnition of
KI will have to wait until we introduce the other elements of M.
At this point it should be clearer why I have proposed such a variety of
inevitability operators in the place of Sect. 3 single modal operator I. Given
a moment of time t, if a future proposition Fα is true in all histories passing
through t, α is going to happen no matter which history becomes the case.
Therefore we have an operator of historical inevitability. On the other hand,
if α is true at t, but also at all alternative moments to t, then α is not only the
case: it had to be the case, for even if the course of the world were diﬀerent,
α would still be true. Therefore the operator of local inevitability. If besides
that α is true at all co-instantaneous moments to t, even looking at diﬀerent
courses the world could have followed at distant moments in the past, α would
still be true. Therefore the notion of global inevitability.
This variety of inevitability operators allows us to state in a more precise
way the issues of determinism, fatalism and free-will. While (Det) can be stated
in terms of both HI and LI:
8 M /||−t,h α stands for it is not the case that M t,h α.
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(Det) α → P(HI:F α)
(Det′) α → LI: α
(Fat) is stated in terms of HI:
(Fat) F α → HI:F α
It can also be stated, in both weaker and stronger ways, in terms of LI:
(Fat′) F α → F(LI: α)
(Fat′′) F α → LI:F α
While (Fat) implies (Fat′), the other way round is not true; and while
(Fat′′) implies (Fat), the other way round is not the case. The threat to the
existence of free-will can also be represented in terms of LI:
(FW) [a]Will:α →LI:([a]Will:α)
Now, branching time theory is often seen as a theory of indeterminism
(see [1,4,5]). But while branching time theory in general and (Det) in par-
ticular captures the notion of local determinism, it is, at ﬁrst sight, at odds
with the notion of a global determinism: in one sense, if our world is globally
determinist, there is no branching. There are two ways to answer this. First,
by pointing out that our semantic framework allows branching, but does not
force it. There can be linear models:
Definition 4.10. Let M =< T,≺,V, G, || ||,K,W > be a model. M is a linear
model if and only if, for every t1, t2, t3 ∈ T, if t3 is such that t3 ≺ t1and
t3 ≺ t2, then either t1 = t2 or t1 ≺ t2 or t2 ≺ t1. A non-linear model is called
a branching model.
It is easy to see that if M is a linear model then (Det) holds for every
formula α in M. The same can be said about (Fat). Further, in a linear model
our three notions of inevitability are extensionally identical.
Second, global determinism and fatalism can be deﬁned in branching
models by postulating a thin red line (see [1,4] and [5]).9 The idea is that among
the several histories of a (branching) model passing through a distinguished
moment, say t, there is a special history, a thing red one,10 which is how things
are really going to happen. For example, suppose h2 is our thin red line; even
though in t42 both p and ¬p are historically possible (p is false at t54 but true
at t55), it is ¬p which turns out to be true in the instant immediately posterior
to t42. Therefore, even though the future is in some sense branching, there in
fact only one way the world could actually be. I will come back to this idea in
the next section.
9 I shall overlook here the issue about the tenability of the doctrine of a thin red line. For
an overview of the debate and a defense of it see [6].
10 The expression comes from the saying that the British Empire was maintained by a thin
red line of soldiers in service to the Queen ([1], p. 366).
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5. The Semantics of Karma
Continuing the deﬁnition of the components of our model, we have as follows:
Definition 4.2 (continuation). A model M is a sextuple < T,≺,V,G, || ||,W,K >
where
(iv) G is a non-empty set of agents;
(v) || ||: A → G is a function which maps (names of) agents to elements of
G;
(vi) W: GxT → ℵ(H)11 is a function which, for each moment of time t and
agent g, gives the will-history of g at t. W is such that, for all t ∈ T and
g ∈ G, W(g,t) = ∅ (non-contradiction condition);
A will-history is a set of histories containing, for a given agent g and moment
of time t, all compatible histories with the will of g at t. In symbols: W(g,t).
I shall call the members of W(g,t) will-histories. With the help of W, I can
deﬁne the truth-conditions of the modal operator Will:
Definition 4.9 (continuation). Let M =< T,≺,V,G, || ||,K,W > be a model, t
∈ T a moment of time, h ∈ H a history such that t ∈ h, α ∈ LK a formula and
p ∈ P a propositional symbol.
(xi) M ||−t,h [a]Will:α iﬀ (1) for all h′∈ W(||a||, t) and t′∈It such that t′∈h′,
M ||−t′,h′ α and (2) there is at least one t′∈It such that M /||−t′,h′ α, for
some h′∈H such that t′∈h′;
[a]Will:α is true at t in the case α is true at all histories compatible with the
will of a (at t) at the instant to which t belongs. Condition (2) is there to
exclude tautologies and inevitable propositions; agents are therefore assumed
to satisfy a criterion of minimal rationality according to which there cannot be
willing towards tautological or inevitable propositions. Neither can an agent
will contradictory propositions; this is guaranteed by the non-contradiction
condition in the deﬁnition of W.
Here is the ﬁnal component of our model:
Definition 4.2 (continuation). A model M is a sextuple < T,≺,V,G, || ||,W,K >
where
(vii) K: GxT → ℵ(H) is a function which, for each agent g and moment t, gives
the karmic pool of g at t. K is such that K(g,t) = ∅ (non-contradiction
condition); if h∈K(g,t), then for all h′∈H such that t∈h′, h ∼=t h′ (histor-
ical relevance condition); if Tt = Tt′ , then K(g,t) = K(g,t′) (alternative
condition); there is at least one h ∈ H such that h ∈ K(g,t) for all g ∈ G
(collective karma condition); and there is at least one h ∈ H such that t
∈ h and h/∈K(g,t) (incompatibility principle condition).
A karmic pool is a set of histories containing, for a given agent g and moment
of time t, all karmically compatible histories with the intentional actions done
11 ℵ(Γ) is the powerset of Γ.
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by g up to t as well as with the psychological state of g at t. The idea is
very simple. Up to moment t, agent g has done several actions with speciﬁc
states of mind, either in the life he or she is living at moment t or in past
ones. According to karma theory, these actions have produced several eﬀects,
to be actualized and ‘enjoyed’ by g at t or at moments posterior to t. In some
histories these eﬀects are the case; in others they are not. The histories in
which these eﬀects are the case are karmically compatible with the actions
done by g up to t; the set containing all of them is called the karmic pool of g
at t (in symbols: K(g,t)).
With the help of K, I can ﬁnally deﬁne the karmic eﬀect modal operator:
Definition 4.9 (continuation). Let M =< T,≺,V,G, || ||,K,W > be a model, t
∈ T a moment of time, h ∈ H a history such that t ∈ h, α ∈ LK a formula and
p ∈ P a propositional symbol.
(xii) M ||−t,h [a]KE:α iﬀ (1) for all h′∈ K(||a||, t) and t′∈ Tt such that t′∈h′,
M ||−t′,h′ α, (2) there is t′∈It such that M /||−t′,h′ α, for some h′∈H such
that t′∈h′ and (3) M ||−t′,h′ α or M ||−t′,h′ ¬ α for all h′∈ W(||a||, t) and
t′∈It such that t′∈h′.
[a]KE:α is true at t in the case α is true at all karmically compatible histories
with the past actions of a and alternative moments to t. Similarly to Will,
(2) is there to exclude tautologies and inevitable propositions from the set of
karmic eﬀects of a. Condition (3) guarantees that if α is a karmic eﬀect of
a, then α aﬀects a; as one would expect, the Person-Aﬀecting Principle is a
tautology in our system:
(PAP) [a]KE:α →[a]Aﬀect:α
As far as the conditions in the deﬁnition of K are concerned, the non-
contradiction condition is there to prevent formulas of the kind [a]KE:(α∧¬ α)
to be valid. The historical relevance condition guarantees that all histories
belonging to the karmic pool of a at t pass through moments alternative to
t. The rationale behind it is that the karmic pool of a at t was produced by
actions and psychological states of a at moments anterior to t; at the limit, it
was produced at the moment t′ immediately anterior to t. As such, since the
karmic pool contains histories which might be lived by a given t, the karmic
pool only makes sense if it contains just those histories which are possible
considering t′. Another consequence of the karmic pool being produced at t′ is
that the karmic pool of alternative moments is the same; that is the alternative
condition. That is why we have, in the deﬁnition of KE, considered alternative
moments and not instantaneous moments, as we have done in the deﬁnition
of Will.
Finally,12 the collective karma condition guarantees that there is at least
one history common the karmic pools of all agents. It could be called the
12 The explanation of the incompatibility principle condition will have to wait until Sect. 6,
where I shall explain how the Incompatibility Principle is taken into account in my semantics.
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some-thing-happens condition as well, and the reason for this is crucial for my
analysis. To understand why, consider the following deﬁnitions:
Definition 5.1. Let M =< T,≺,V,G, || ||,K,W > be a model and t ∈ T a
moment of time. The karmic world at t (in symbols: Kt) is the intersection of
all karmic pools of all agents; in symbols: h ∈ Kt iﬀ h ∈ K(g,t) for all g ∈ G.
Definition 5.2. Let M =< T,≺,V,G, || ||,K,W > be a model and t ∈ T a
moment of time. t is karmically normal iﬀ there is at least one h ∈ Kt such
that t ∈ h. TK ⊆T is the set of all karmically normal moments of T.
Definition 5.3. Let M =< T,≺,V,G, || ||,K,W > be a model and t ∈ T a
moment of time. If t ∈ TK, then the set of histories passing through it which
belong to the karmic world at t (in symbols: Ht) is called the karmically normal
histories of t; in symbols: Ht = {h ∈ Kt|t ∈ h}.
With these deﬁnitions at hand, I can deﬁne the truth conditions of our
last modal operator: the karmic inevitability operator.
Definition 4.9 (continuation). Let M =< T,≺,V,G, || ||,K,W > be a model, t
∈ T a moment of time, h ∈ H a history such that t ∈ h, α ∈ LK a formula and
p ∈ P a propositional symbol.
(xiii) M ||−t,h KI:α iﬀ for all t′∈TK such that t′∈ Tt and all h′∈ Ht, M ||−t′,h′ α.
In other words, α is karmically inevitable if and only if α is true at all
karmically normal moments alternatives to t and histories passing through
these moments. Since only moments alternative to t are being considered, LI:α
implies KI:α. We then have the complete list of the relations holding between
our inevitability operators:
Theorem 5.1. Let M =< T,≺,V,G, || ||,K,W > be a model, t ∈ T a moment
of time and h ∈ H a history and α ∈ LK a formula.
(i) If M ||−t,h GI:α then M ||−t,h LI:α;
(ii) If M ||−t,h LI:α then M ||−t,h HI:α;
(iii) If M ||−t,h LI:α then M ||−t,h KI:α.
Now, going back to the some-thing-happens condition, if the theory of
karma is really true, the histories belonging to Kt cannot be possible courses
of the way things could be in the same way that histories not contained in
Kt are. To suppose they can is to trivialize the theory of karma; if Kt has no
distinguished status, then there is hardly a sense in saying that an individual
is going to suﬀer or enjoy the karmic eﬀects of his or her actions. Therefore, if
anything is to happen at all, Kt cannot be empty.
But there is more than this. What seems to be at stake here is a doctrine
very similar to the thin red line, with the diﬀerence that instead of a line we
have a thin red tree, or a karmic thin red tree. The other diﬀerence is that
since at every moment possibly new actions will be done and new karmic
eﬀects become the case, at every moment there will be a diﬀerent karmic thin
red tree, which is to be distinguished from the rest of the tree formed from <T,
≺>. But distinguished in which sense? Usually branching time theorists adopt
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a realist view of time: all moments of time have the same ontological status;
they are all equally existing entities ([6], pp. 106–107). Following this stream,
one ﬁrst answer could be to say that the histories of Kt are distinguished in an
ontological sense: from the point of view of t, histories belonging to Kt are all
that is ontologically possible; they are the real possibilities; the world cannot
be in a way which is not contained in Kt.
This position poses a couple of problems. First, what is the status of
histories not contained in Kt? Are they some sort of abstract or linguistic
representation? But representation of what? It cannot be representation of
ways the world could be, for we have assumed the world cannot be diﬀerent
from Kt (see [5], pp. 156–159). Second, even if we could somehow solve this
issue, at every moment there will possibly be diﬀerent karmic histories. This
means that some histories would suddenly become ontologically possible, while
others will cease to be so. It is certainly not trivial how one could support such
an odd metaphysical doctrine.
One way to avoid these problems is to adopt a more standard position
and take all histories as having the same status, that is to say, as being onto-
logical possibilities of the way the world could be; altogether, they would form
what Belnap calls our world ([1], pp. 370–371). As far as Kt is concerned,
perhaps all we could say is that it is a brute fact that only histories of Kt
can become the case. Although in one sense solving the problem, this path is
clearly unsatisfactory, for we do want to know why the histories of Kt have
such a distinguished status: to say that they have it because they have it is
frustrating, to say the least.13
I am going to follow a path which, if does not solve these problems,
at least avoids them. In fact, this path allows us to remain silent about the
ontological status of moments of time and histories. In order to explain it, I
need to go back a little and speak about the standard way this issue appears
in possible world semantics.
A model M in modal logic is composed by a non-empty set of possible
worlds W, an accessibility relation between worlds R and a truth function
which maps propositional symbols and possible worlds to truth-values. The
evaluation relation ||− is deﬁned in terms of models and possible worlds: M
||−w α means that α is true at world w of model M; if α is true at all worlds of
M we write M ||− α. As far as the consequence relation is concerned (something
we have not yet deﬁned for our logic), the most complete way to deﬁne it is to
make reference to two sets of premises: a set of global premises and a set of local
premises [13]. Formally we have as follows: α is a logical consequence of A and
B (in symbols: ) if and only if, for every model M such that M ||− α
for all α ∈ A, and for every w of M such that M ||−w β for all β ∈ B, M ||−w ϕ;
while A is the set of global premises, B is the set of local premises. From a proof-
theoretical point of view, the distinction appears in the application of the neces-
sitation rule (from α conclude  α); it can be applied only to global premises.
13 See [5] and [6] for a discussion on these questions on the context of branching time theory
and the thin red line.
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Now, despite the debate over the nature of possible worlds and whether
or not there are distinguished worlds (such as the actual world), from an infer-
ential point of view, at the same time that there is no need of engaging in such
sort of debate here, there are preferred or distinguished models and worlds.
When we write a derivation from to φ, all steps of the derivation can be
seen as valid only inside a very speciﬁc set of models and worlds. If formula φ is
derived only from global premises, we say that φ is true in all models M (and in
all worlds of M) such that M ||− α for all α ∈A. It is from this perspective that
we can write φ: this does not mean that φ is true in all worlds of all models,
but only in the worlds of those models selected by A. And if there is a local
premise involved in the derivation of φ, then by writing φ we simply mean that
it is true in these models and worlds w such that M ||−w β for all β ∈B. But by
saying that we are not giving any special status to those models and worlds.
Before deﬁning the notion of logical consequence, let me introduce some
quite straightforward deﬁnitions:
Definition 5.4. Let M =< T,≺,V,G, || ||,K,W > be a model and α ∈ LK a
formula. M ||− α iﬀ, for all t ∈ T, M ||−t,h α for all h ∈ H such that t ∈ h; M
||−K α iﬀ, for all t ∈ TK, M ||−t,h α for all h∈ Ht.
Definition 5.5. Let A⊆ LK be a set of formulas. The sets of models MG and
MK are deﬁned as follows: MG(A) = {M|M ||− α for all α ∈ A};MK(A) =
{M|M ||−K α for all α ∈ A}.
Now the deﬁnition of logical consequence:
Definition 5.6. Let A,B,C ⊆ LK be three sets of formulas and ϕ ∈ LK a formula.
ϕ is a karmic logical consequence of A, B and C (in symbols: )
if and only if, for all models M ∈ MG(A)∩MK(B), t ∈ TK (of M) and h∈ Ht
such that M ||−t,h φ for all φ ∈C, M ||−t,h ϕ. |= ϕ is an abbreviation for
, in case of which I call ϕ a tautology.
While A is the set of global premises, B and C are the set of karmic
premises and local premises, respectively. From a proof-theoretical point of
view, which shall not be developed here, while all inevitability rules (α/GI:α,
α/LI:α, α/HI:α and α/KI:α) would be applied only to formulas derived exclu-
sively with the help of global premises, for formulas derived with the help of
some karmic premise only the karmic inevitability rule (α/KI:α) could be used;
if the formula uses local premises no inevitability rule could be used.
Following the idea of global and local premises of modal logic explained
above, I am doing three restrictions in the selection of the models, moments
of time and histories to be used in the evaluation of . The ﬁrst
one is that I pick up only those models M such that M ||− α for all global
premises α. Recall that in order for a formula α to be satisﬁed by M (M ||− α)
it must be satisﬁed by all moments t of M and all histories h passing through
t (M ||−t,h α for all h ∈ H such that t ∈ h). Out of these models, I pick up
the models M in which all karmic premises β ∈B are true in all its karmically
normal moments t and karmically normal histories of t. This is the second
restriction. Finally, for each of these moments, I pick up only those karmically
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normal moments t and karmically normal histories of t that satisfy all local
premises. It is in those models, moments and histories that our conclusion ϕ
has to be true for the consequence relation to hold.
The relevant point here is that I do not postulate any kind of ontolog-
ical distinction of a speciﬁc set of moments and histories. But as far as the
consequence relation is concerned, I pick up only karmic normal times and, con-
sequently, histories belonging to the karmic world, solving thus, in one sense,
the issue about the some-thing-happens condition and the distinguished status
that histories belonging to Kt should have. The relation can
perhaps be read as follows: if the theory of karma is true and if those premises
are true according to their respective roles, then ϕ is also true.
6. Karma, Freedom of Will, Determinism and Fatalism
With the semantic framework fully deﬁned, I can analyze more rigorously the
questions posed at the beginning of Sect. 3. To begin with, let me recall the
way I have represented the notions of determinism, fatalism and the threat to
free-will in Sect. 4: (Det) α →P(HI:Fα); (Det′) α →LI:α; (Fat) Fα →HI:Fα;
(Fat′) Fα →F(LI:α); (Fat′′) Fα →LI:Fα and (FW) [a]Will:α →LI:([a]Will:α).
It should be noted that none of these formulas are tautology in our system:
Theorem 6.1. The following relations are valid14:
(i) /|= α →P(HI:Fα);
(ii) /|= α →LI:α;
(iii) /|= Fα →HI:Fα;
(iv) /|= Fα →F(LI:α);
(v) /|= Fα →LI:Fα;
(vi) /|= [a]Will:α →LI:([a]Will:α).
Therefore, strictly speaking our logic of karma does not embrace deter-
minism or fatalism, neither is it against free-will.
However, there is another inevitability operator—KI—, which is very
alike to the local inevitability operator LI: both take into consideration only
alternative moments and histories passing through those moments, the diﬀer-
ence being that KI restricts the moments to karmically normal moments t and
histories to karmically normal histories of t. Now, if all these principles can
be represented solely with the help of LI, even if in stronger versions, they
can also be represented with the help of KI. We have therefore the following
karmic versions of (Det), (Fat) and (FW):
(DetK) α →KI:α
(FatK) Fα →KI:Fα
(FWK) [a]Will:α →KI:([a]Will:α)
14 /|= α stands for it is not the case that  α.
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We have seen in Sect. 3 how these principles—in qualiﬁed versions and
expressed in terms of our generic inevitability operator I—could be derived
from our karma principles. A similar movement can be made in terms of KI.
From (EP) and (CEP) (now expressed in terms of KI)
(EP) α∧[a]Aﬀect:α →[a]KE:α
(CEP) [a]KE:α →KI:α
we obtain (KIP):
(KIP) α∧[a]Aﬀect:α →KI:α
From (KIP) we obtain a qualiﬁed version of (FW)
(FWK-aa) [a]Will:α →KI:([a]Will:α), where [a]Will:α is a second-order will-
ing15
as well as of (DetK):
(DetK-aa) α →KI:α, where α is an agent-aﬀecting proposition,
from which we obtain the following qualiﬁed version of (FatK):
(FatK-aa) Fα →KI:Fα, where α is an agent-aﬀecting proposition.
Finally, from (Inev), now represented with the help of KI—
(Inev) KI:α → α
—, (PAP), (EP) and (CEP) we get what I have called the trivialization of KE:
(8) α∧[a]Aﬀect:α ↔[a]KE:α
The important question now is: are all these principles valid in our logic of
karma? It is a trivial task to show that (CEP), (PAP) and (Inev) are:
Theorem 6.2. The following relations are valid:
(i) |= [a]KE:α →KI:α
(ii) |= [a]KE:α →[a]Aﬀect:α
(iii) |= KI:α → α
The same, however, cannot be said about (EP). To see this, suppose
that |= α∧[a]Aﬀect:α →[a]KE:α. If this is so, then for all models M, M
||−K α∧[a]Aﬀect:α →[a]KE:α, that is to say, for every t ∈ TK, M ||−t,h
α∧[a]Aﬀect:α →[a]KE:α for all h∈ Ht. But there is no contradiction at all
in a model M, moment t ∈ TK (of M) and history h ∈ Ht such that M
||−t,h α, M ||−t,h [a]Will:α but M /||−t,h [a]KE:α: it suﬃces that there is
h′∈ K(||a||, t) and t′∈ Tt such that t′∈h′ such that M /||−t′,h′ α. Therefore,
/|= α∧[a]Aﬀect:α →[a]KE:α.
15 As I have deﬁned in Sect. 3, [a]Will:a is a second-order willing if and only if it is true
that [a]Will:([a]Will:α) or that [a]Will:([a]Will:¬ α).
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In order to see why this is so, let us ponder on what it would take for (EP)
to be a tautology in our logic. Since one part of the antecedent of (EP), namely
[a]Aﬀect:α, guarantees conditions (2) and (3) of KE’s semantic deﬁnition, all it
takes for α∧[a]Aﬀect:α →[a]KE:α to be a tautology is to establish a connection
between the other part of the antecedent (α) and condition (1) (which requires
that for all h′∈ K(||a||, t) and t′∈ Tt such that t′∈h′, M ||−t′,h′ α). From the
semantic structure we have, the truth of α would guarantee the truth of [a]KE:α
in one condition only: if the model at hand were a linear one:
Theorem 6.3. Let M be a model. If M is a linear model, then M ||−K
α∧[a]Aﬀect:α →[a]KE:α.
However, even if this works from a formal point of view, it does not do
it from a conceptual standpoint; and this has to do with the two remaining
principles we have introduced in Sect. 2. The Change Principle says that the
karmic pool of an agent can change. In our semantics this is represented by
the fact that K is a moment of time function and that the histories belonging
to K(g,t) are just a small subset of H. That is to say, there are probably many
incompatible ways the world could be which are not part of K(g,t) and which
might be part of K(g,t′), where t′ is a moment immediately posterior to t.
Also, moments which are part of K(g,t) might cease to be so. This is made
possible by our tree-like time structure, where time branches in the future.
It has also to do with the Incompatibility Principle, which says that there
are ways the world could be which are incompatible with the karmic eﬀects of
a at t. This principle is guaranteed by the restrictions imposed upon K, but
also by the tree-like structure of our semantics. If there were not diﬀerent and
incompatible ways the world could be from the perspective of moment of time
t, there would not be ways the world could be which are incompatible with the
karmic eﬀects of a at t. From this is clear that the branching of future is not
an optional feature of our model: in order for the Incompatibility Principle to
hold, there must be a branching of future histories. As a consequence of this,
there cannot be linear models in our logic. We therefore have to reformulate
our deﬁnition of karmic logical consequence.
We start by deﬁning what we call a karmic model—
Definition 6.1. Let M be a model. M is a karmic model if and only if M a
branching model.
—to then redeﬁning the notion of karmic logical consequence so that is
applied only to karmic models:
Definition 5.6 (reformulation). Let A,B,C ⊆ LK be three sets of formulas and
ϕ ∈ LK a formula. ϕ is a karmic logical consequence of A, B and C (in symbols:
if and only if, for all karmic models M∈ MG(A)∩MK(B), t ∈
TK (of M) and h ∈ Ht such that M ||−t,h φ for all φ ∈ C, M ||−t,h ϕ.
In this new framework, there is no place for (KE) and for the threat that it
poses to the freedom of will and to a fully non-deterministic world.
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One might however object that our semantics still does not fully guar-
antee that the Incompatibility Principle is satisﬁed. It might be that K(g,t)
contains all histories which pass through t, which makes that, from the point
of view of t, there are no ways the world could be which are incompatible with
the karmic eﬀects of a at t. That this does not happen is guaranteed by the
incompatibility principle condition present in the deﬁnition of K.
7. Conclusion
I have presented in this paper what I could call ‘a logic of karma’. It has been
done from a semantic point of view only, and its formal properties were barely
scratched here. Although to formally develop this framework is certainly an
important task—and I plan to do this in future works—, the main reason
for introducing it was to provide a minimally rigorous framework in which
the relations that exist between karma theory on one hand and determinism,
fatalism and free-will on the other could be analyzed.
My main conclusion was twofold. First, that the basic principles of karma
theory, together with a couple of very simple logical and conceptual principles,
do imply a sort of determinism, fatalism and lack of free-will. There is however
some more to say about these principles. Despite their apparent individual
intuitiveness, taking them together seem to trivialize the very notion of karmic
eﬀect. Second, after coming up with a full semantic framework in which the
notions of karmic eﬀects, inevitability and will could be represented, it turned
out that one of these principles, the explanation principle—if an actual state
of aﬀairs s aﬀects a, then s is a karmic eﬀect of a—is not generally valid. As a
consequence of that, the threat to free-will, as well as the link between karma
theory and determinism and fatalism, were vanquished. Although perhaps a
good news for the karma theorist, there is a high price to pay: the loss of karma
theory’s explanatory power, which is allegedly one of its greatest virtues.
This conclusion of course depends on the features of the semantic frame-
work inside of which the principles were represented. A critic could bring into
question virtually any of the several theoretical decisions I made in the con-
struction of this framework. Unfortunately I would not have space to anticipate
and respond to these criticisms; all I can say is that I have followed the stan-
dard way of representing agentive sentences in branching time theory. Also,
my approach to karma theory was a minimal one: besides taking into consid-
eration only the core of karma theory, the theoretical decisions I have made
were also minimal (as well as reasonable, I believe). Naturally the principles
I laid down in Sect. 3 are not exclusive to theories of karma: although I have
argued that any theory of karma should satisfy these principles, some theory
might satisfy them without having nothing to do with karma or reincarnation.
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